Let's Know Things Podcast Por Colin Wright capa

Let's Know Things

Let's Know Things

De: Colin Wright
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 A calm, non-shouty, non-polemical, weekly news analysis podcast for folks of all stripes and leanings who want to know more about what's happening in the world around them. Hosted by analytic journalist Colin Wright since 2016.

letsknowthings.substack.comColin Wright Política e Governo
Episódios
  • Circular Finance

    Circular Finance
    Oct 21 2025
    This week we talk about entanglements, monopolies, and illusory money.We also discuss electrification, LLMs, and data centers.Recommended Book: The Extinction of Experience by Christine RosenTranscriptOne of the big claims about artificial intelligence technologies, including but not limited to LLM-based generative AI tech, like ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, is that they will serve as universal amplifiers.Electricity is another universal amplifier, in that electrifying systems allows you to get a lot more from pretty much every single thing you do, while also allowing for the creation of entirely new systems.Cooking things in the kitchen? Much easier with electricity. Producing things on an assembly line? The introduction of electricity allows you to introduce all sorts of robotics, measuring tools, and safety measures that would not have otherwise been available, and all of these things make the entire process safer, cheaper, and a heck of a lot more effective and efficient.The prime argument behind many sky-high AI company valuations, then, is that if these things evolve in the way they could evolve, becoming increasingly capable and versatile and cheap, cooking could become even easier, manufacturing could become still faster, cheaper, and safer, and every other aspect of society and the economy would see similar gains.If you’re the people making AI, if you own these tools, or a share of the income derived from them, that’s a potentially huge pot of money: a big return on your investment. People make fortunes off far more focused, less-impactful companies and technologies all the time, and being able to create the next big thing in not just one space, but every space? Every aspect of everything, potentially? That’s like owning a share of electricity, and making money every time anyone uses electricity for anything.Through that lens, the big boom in both use of and investment in AI technologies maybe shouldn’t be so surprising. This represents a potentially generational sea-change in how everything works, what the economy looks like, maybe even how governments are run, militaries fight, and so on. If you can throw money into the mix, why wouldn’t you? And if that’s the case, the billions upon billions of dollars sloshing around in this corner of the tech world make a lot of sense; it may be curious that there’s not even more money being invested.Belief in that promise is not universal, however.A lot of people see these technologies not as the next electricity, but maybe the next smartphone, or perhaps the next SUV.Smartphones changed a whole lot about society too, but they’re hardly the same groundbreaking, omni-powerful upgrade that electricity represents.SUVs, too, flogged sales for flailing car companies, boosting their revenues at a moment in which they desperately needed to sell more vehicles to survive. But they were just another, more popular model of what already came before. There’s a chance AI will be similar to that: better software than came before, for some people’s use-cases—but not revolutionary, not groundbreaking even on the scale of pocketable phone-computers.What I’d like to talk about today are the peculiar economics that seem to be playing a role in the AI boom, and why many analysts and financial experts are eyeballing these economics warily, worrying about what they maybe represent, and possibly portend.—The term ‘exuberance,’ in the context of markets, refers to an excitement among investors—sometimes professional investors, sometimes casual investors, sometimes both—about a particular company, technology, or financial product type.The surge in interest and investment in cryptoassets during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, including offshoot products like NFTs, was seemingly caused by a period of exuberance, sparked by the novelty of the product, the riches a few lucky insiders made off these products, and the desire by many people—pros and consumer-grade investors—to get in on that action, at a moment in which there wasn’t as much to do in the world as usual.Likewise, the gobs of money plowed into early internet companies, and the money thrown at companies laying fiberoptic cable for the presumed boom in internet customers, were, in retrospect, at least partly the consequence of irrational exuberance.In some cases these investors were just too early, as was the case with those cable-laying companies—the majority of them going out of business after blowing through a spectacular amount of money in a short period of time, and not finding enough paying customers to fund all that expansion—in others it was the result of sky-high valuations that were based on little beyond the exuberance of investors who probably should have known better, but who couldn’t get past their fear of missing out on the next big thing.In that latter case, that flow of money into early dotcom startups did fund a few winners that survived the ...
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    16 minutos
  • Tariff Leverage

    Tariff Leverage
    Oct 14 2025
    This week we talk about trade wars, TACO theory, and Chinese imports.We also discuss negotiation, protectionism, and threat spirals.Recommended Book: More Than Words by John WarnerTranscriptIn January of 2018, then first-term US President Trump announced a slew of tariffs and trade barriers against several countries, including Canada, Mexico, and those in the European Union.The most significant of these new barriers and tariffs were enacted against China, though, as Trump had long claimed that China, the US’s most important trade partner by many measures, was taking advantage of the US market; a claim that economists tepidly backed, as while some of the specifics, like those related to intellectual property theft on the part of China, were pretty overt, the Chinese government fairly brazenly gobbling up IP and technology from US companies that do business in the country before hobbling those US interests in China and handing that IP and technology off to their own, China-born copies, claims about a trade deficit were less clear-cut—most of those sorts of claims seemed to be the result of a misunderstanding about how international trade works.That said, Trump had made a protectionist stance part of his platform, so he kicked off his administration by imposing a package of targeted tariffs against specific product categories from China, including things like solar panels and washing machines. Those were followed by more tariffs on steel and aluminum—from a lot of countries, not just China—and this implementation of trade barriers between the US and long-time trade partners, which had mostly enjoyed barrier-free trade up till that point, kicked off a trade war, with the Trump administration announcing, out of nowhere, new tariffs or limitations, and the country on the pointy end of that new declaration announcing their own counter, usually something the US sells to their country, while in the background, both countries tried to negotiate new trade terms on the down-low.There was a lot of tit-for-tatting in those first couple years of the first Trump administration, and they led to a lot of negotiations between the US government and these foreign governments, which in turn led to the lifting of many such barriers, though the weaponization of barriers continued, with the administration, for instance, announcing a tariff on all imports from Mexico until the Mexican government was able to halt all illegal immigration coming into the US; negotiation ended that threat, too, but this early salvo upset a lot of the US’s long-time allies, while also making it clear that Trump intended to open negotiations with these sorts of threats, whenever possible—which had the knock-on effect of everyone taking the threats pretty seriously, as they were often incredibly dangerous to specific industries, while also taking them less seriously because it was obvious they were intended to be a negotiating tactic.When Trump left office, a bunch of international relationships had been scarred by this approach to trade deals, and when Biden replaced him, he dropped most of the new tariffs against long-time allies, but kept most of the China tariffs in place, especially those related to green technologies like electric vehicles and semiconductors, the local-made versions of which were becoming a big focus for the Biden administration. The administration then went on to expand upon those tariffs, against China, in some cases.What I’d like to talk about today is how this approach to trade protectionism and negotiation has ballooned under the second Trump administration, and what a new threat against China by Trump might mean for how the relationship between these two countries evolves, moving forward.—Trump’s second administration opened with an executive order that declared a national emergency, claiming that the Chinese were trafficking drugs, especially synthetic opioids like fentanyl, into the US, and that this allowed criminals to profit from destroying the lives of US citizens.This declaration allowed him to unleash a flurry of tariffs against China, first imposing 10% on all Chinese imports, then increasing that to 20% in March of 2025.China retaliated, imposing tariffs of 15% on mostly US energy products, like coal and natural gas, and on some types of agricultural machines, while also engaging in some legal pressure against US companies, like Google. They followed this up with tariffs against meat and dairy products, and suspended US lumber import rights, and disallowed three US firms from selling soybeans to China.The US reciprocated, and China reciprocated back. There was a period of spiraling broad tariffs and import bans in the mid-2025 between the US and China, which led to an aggregate baseline tariff on Chinese imports of 104%, which was followed with an aggregate Chinese baseline tariff against US goods of 84%. The US then upped theirs to 145%, and China raised theirs to 125%.Again, vital to ...
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    16 minutos
  • Gamewashing

    Gamewashing
    Oct 7 2025
    This week we talk about Electronic Arts, 3DO, and the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund.We also discuss Jared Kushner, leveraged buyouts, and loot boxes.Recommended Book: Bandwidth by Dan CarusoTranscriptElectronic Arts, often shorthanded as EA, was founded in 1982 in California by a former Apple employee named Trip Hawkins, who also went on to found the ill-fated 3DO company, which made video game hardware, and the somewhat more prolific, but also ultimately ill-fated casual game developer Digital Chocolate.EA, though, has been an absolutely astounding success. It’s business model was predicated on the premise of selling video games directly to retailers, rather than going through intermediaries. This allowed them to gain more market share than their competitors right off the bat, and it helped them glean higher margins than their competitors from each direct sale, too.EA also established an early reputation for treating its developers really well. They were the first gaming company to feature their developers in advertising and to give them platforms, promoting them as video game artists, basically, and it shared the profits netted from those direct sales with these develops—which in turn meant all the best developers really wanted to work for EA, which led to a beneficial cycle where they created better and better, and more and more financially successful games.In the late-80s, they started deviating from this model somewhat, scooping up a collection of successful independent game development studios and deviating, at times, from the creative lead’s vision when releasing their games. They also refocused a fair bit of their resources on franchises, like the immensely successful, as it turned out, Madden NFL series, and they branched out into producing games for the console market, including the still-new Nintendo Entertainment System, in 1990.That same year, EA went public on the NASDAQ, the company got new leadership when Hawkins decided to refocus on his far less successful 3DO hardware startup, and in an interesting twist, the arrival of the Sony Playstation in North America caused EA to drop support for 3DO hardware in the mid-90s so it could refocus on Playstation games, which were a lot more lucrative.By the mid-90s, EA had an astonishingly large and successful software library, including franchises like the aforementioned Madden games and the FIFA soccer games, but also celebrity-tied games like Shaq Fu, and military shooters like Jungle and Urban Strike.By the early-2000s, EA was making exclusive licensing deals with the NFL and ESPN, in order to stave off newfound sports game competitors, and it was the only video game company to consistently make a profit, most others experiencing feast and famine cycles, with periodic wins, but a whole lot of losses they had to cover with the profits from those wins. EA, in contrast, had a reliable stable of profit-sources, and it thus had a whole lot of leverage in terms of attracting and retaining talent, but also getting big names and brands on board, for collaborative projects.What I’d like to talk about today is what happened to EA during and following the 2008 economic crisis, and how and why it recently became an acquisition target for Saudi Arabia.—In 2008, when the global economy was collapsing, EA suffered a bad holiday sales season and fired 1,100 employees and closed 12 of their facilities early the following year. Later in 2009, the company announced the firing of another 1,500 employees, which was about 17% of their total workforce at the time, and in 2010 they acquired a gaming company that focused on mobile games, which were becoming increasingly popular, now that many people had touch-capable smartphones, which brought hot new franchises like Angry Birds under their brand umbrella.On the strength of that acquisition and all those downsizings, in early 2011, EA announced that it hit $3.8 billion in revenue in the financial year for the first time, and in early 2012, it announced it surpassed $1 billion in digital revenue during the previous year, which was a huge figure that early in the digital media landscape. It used some of those profits to scoop up another mobile-first gaming company, adding properties like Plants vs Zombies and Peggle to their library.EA completed another mass-firing in 2013, dismissing 10% of their employees under what they called a reorganization, around the same time they announced an exclusive license with Disney that would allow them to develop Star Wars games.Their stock value boomed in the following years, as a result of those cost-savings measures, and those new relationships, and emboldened by record-high stock valuations, in the mid-20-teens, the company started releasing big-name games, like Star Wars Battlefront 2, with random-content loot boxes and other sorts of microtransactions.This did not go over well with players, who decried these in-game purchasing options as ‘pay to win’ ...
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    18 minutos
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