Chernobyl, Bhopal, Three Mile Island, Deepwater Horizon, Texas City — What do they have in common? Human error or human factors were identified as contributing to the incidents. But what are these factors?

Understanding how people actually perceive, decide and act is essential to preventing catastrophic industrial accidents and everyday errors.

This In Case You Missed It episode brings the written word to life from the column:

In this episode, Trish Kerin and Traci Purdum explore process hazard analysis revalidations and how to make them more effective. Kerin explains the difference between redoing a PHA and revalidating existing assessments, introducing the Delta HAZOP methodology that focuses on creeping change in facilities. She discusses triggers for revalidation, from legislative requirements to significant operational changes, and emphasizes the importance of selecting the right team and methodology. Kerin highlights how AI and machine learning can help gather data and identify trends, while stressing that human expertise remains essential. The key takeaway: approach revalidations with rigor and discipline, not as tick-box exercises, to truly identify hazards and manage risk effectively.

Applying risk management principles helps Process Safety Engineer Trish Kerin navigate her first successful year of self-employment. Listen in as Trish brings her January column to life. You can read her column here.

Engineers couldn't prove danger, so managers launched anyway. Seven astronauts died when O-rings failed in freezing temperatures. Apply the lessons learned to help avoid future incidents.

Three Key Takeaways:

1. Reverse the burden of proof: Require positive proof that something is safe before proceeding, rather than forcing engineers to prove it's unsafe.
2. Simplify safety communication: Complex data failed to convince decision-makers, but a simple demonstration (O-ring in ice water) made the danger crystal clear.
3. Protect technical authority: Engineers need more than just formal authority to stop unsafe operations — they need genuine psychological safety to exercise that power without career consequences.

This In Case You Missed It episode brings the written word to life. Today, Trish Kerin, the director of Lead Like Kerin, and Stay Safe columnist for Chemical Processing, will read her column "Bird’s-Eye View Prevents Process Safety Groundings," which was published to chemicalprocessing.com on Dec. 17, 2025.

In this year-end episode, hosts Trish Kerin and Traci Purdum welcome Hayley Little, a U.K.-based process safety engineer who tracks quarterly catastrophic incidents on LinkedIn. The discussion explores origin stories in process safety, the critical gap in fundamental safety knowledge outside petrochemical industries, and the alarming frequency of preventable incidents in lower-hazard sectors. They discuss innovative solutions including AI tools, virtual reality training and social media outreach to democratize process safety education. The conversation emphasizes the urgent need for better university training, field presence over desk work and human factors integration to make it easier to "accidentally get it right."

This In Case You Missed It episode brings the written word to life. Today, Trish Kerin, the director of Lead Like Kerin, and Stay Safe columnist for Chemical Processing, will read the first few chapters from her book “The Platypus Philosophy – how to identify and manage weak signals” This book explores weak signals and focuses on how to identify and manage them to prevent incidents. It uses fun storytelling about the unique platypus as a technique to explain complex concepts and tools. You can purchase this book on Amazon or snag a signed copy from Trish’s website, leadlikekerin.com.

The Buncefield explosion occurred when a gasoline storage tank overfilled after both its level gauge and independent high-level switch failed. Gasoline vapor formed a massive cloud that ignited, causing significant damage to surrounding business parks. Fortunately, the Sunday morning timing prevented fatalities, though 43 injuries occurred. The incident revealed critical gaps in safety control verification, testing procedures, and maintenance regimes. Twenty years later, the disaster emphasizes the importance of recognizing weak signals, maintaining bund integrity, and ensuring operators actively monitor tank filling operations rather than relying solely on automated systems.